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CIVIL LIBERTIES
A CIVIL LIBERTIES ANALYSIS OF
SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS
Larry Gostin
Proponents of surrogacy arrangements' assert that a married couple's
right to "procreative autonomy" includes the right to contract with
consenting collaborators for the purposes of bearing a child. The right to
"genetic continuity" and to rear offspring are all part of the right of
reproductive choice for the contracting father and his partner.2
Critics of surrogacy arrangements similarly cite "reproductive
autonomy" as the basis for their claim that women cannot be compelled
by contract to use their bodies in particular ways-either to forgo the right
to abortion or to be "fetal containers." The right to autonomy over her
own body and to rear the offspring she has borne are all part of the
mother's reproductive freedom.
Both proponents and critics of surrogacy arrangements, therefore,
claim that their positions maximize freedom and liberty. Each position, of
course, focuses on the autonomy of the party the commentator favors; the
analysis is invariably outcome-determinative, without enunciating a
neutral civil liberties framework. Neither proponents nor critics define
clearly what the "right to procreate" entails, or what resolution is
warranted when there is a conflict. What is absent from the debate, and
what I wish to offer, is a civil liberties analysis of surrogacy arrangements.
In this essay I come to the following conclusions based upon a civil
liberties analysis. First, surrogacy arrangements cannot be prohibited or
criminalized. Second, the state cannot ban the exchange of money for
surrogacy services, provided the money is paid for conception, gestation,
and birth. Money, however, cannot be paid on condition that the
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gestational mother waive her parental rights over the child. Third,
contractual provisions that require the gestational mother to waive her
parental rights or her rights to privacy and autonomy are void and
unenforceable. Fourth, when the child is born, both the gestational
mother and the genetic father are the legal parents. If the gestational
mother declines to relinquish her parental rights and a custody battle
ensues, custody of the child should be determined under a "best interests"
standard.
Non-specific performance of the surrogacy agreement is not an elegant
result from the perspective of c6ntract law. It also creates risks for those
who enter into surrogacy arrangements. It does not foreclose the practice
of surrogacy, but would encourage those considering this path to think
carefully before planning to bring a child into the world using this method
of reproduction. There would be no guarantee that the gestational mother
would, after birth, waive her parental rights. If she refused to do so,
however, the genetic father and she would find themselves in no worse
position than that of any two parents involved in a custody dispute.
I want to enunciate the positions taken in this essay very clearly
because they are, to some extent, contrary to the elegant decision of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in the Baby M case.4 The New Jersey
Supreme Court treated that surrogacy arrangement as a simple custody
matter, as I do. However, the court went further by banning, if not
criminalizing, commercial surrogacy.
Where Reproductive Freedoms Coincide
The parties in a surrogacy arrangement have substantial civil liberties
interests: the rights to privacy in making an intimate personal decision
about reproduction; the right to autonomy in decisions affecting the
health and welfare of the mother and the offspring; and the right to
association with future offspring. In this section I will demonstrate the
human and constitutional interests at stake in surrogacy arrangements. I
will argue that if a private consensual arrangement promotes happiness
and contentment for both parties, and involves the exercise of
constitutional rights to privacy and autonomy, then the state should not
interfere with these arrangements in the absence of a clearly
demonstrated harm to the child. This civil liberties analysis balances the
strong reproductive rights that the gestational mother and genetic father
have individually and collectively, on the one hand, with the government's
speculative interests in protecting the unborn child, on the other. I
conclude that the state has no sufficient ground for banning or
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criminalizing surrogacy arrangements.
What interests do constitutional rights to privacy place beyond the
reach of government? The Constitution's promise of privacy and
autonomy enfolds a constellation of intimate sexual, social, and family
relationships, including bodily integrity, personal choice, and future
association with offspring. Privacy is a "sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community welfare and the
development of human personality."5
The U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated a fundamental right "whether
to bear or beget a child."6 Citizens have a privacy right to decide whether,
how, and when to bear a child. Griswold,7 Lovin, and Zablocki9 defined
that right within the marital relationship. The Court in Griswold regarded
marriage as "an association... a harmony of living.., a bilateral loyalty,
not a commercial or social project." In Eisenstadt" and Carey" the Court
extended Griswold to non-married couples, using unequivocal language in
its defense of interpersonal relationships. Contraception, it stated,
concerns "the most intimate of human activities and relationships" 2; a
couple is "an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup."'
3
The Constitution's promise of privacy protects not only human
relationships but also the right to decide whether to conceive and to carry
a fetus to term. Roe v. Wade4 concerned the potential detriments to
pregnant women of being made to carry an unwanted fetus to term-the
medical and psychological harm of having to bear and, possibly, to raise
the child, and the distress of having their own choices about their bodies
overriden by the state. Later, in Akron 5 and Thornburgh,'6 the Supreme
Court refocused its thinking on abortion, describing it as the woman's
private informed choice, which is for her and her physician alone to make.
The contraception cases decided by the Supreme Court also concern
the right to make choices about future offspring. In Griswold v.
Connecticut,7 the first privacy case decided by the Court, the state had
imposed a criminal penalty upon a physician for advising and prescribing
contraception to a married couple, despite the fact that pregnancy would
have jeopardized the woman's health. The Court overturned the statute,
noting that there was a "zone of privacy created by several constitutional
guarantees.' ' 8 By criminalizing the use of contraception the government
had exerted a "maximum destructive impact" upon privacy. 9
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that natural parents have a
constitutionally protected interest to rear their child.2" The "fundamental
liberty interest" in the care, custody, and management of the child extends
even to the unwed father.2' A father's interest is constitutionally protected
when he "act[s] as a father toward his children."22 It is difficult for any
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unwed father to demonstrate his parental attachment to a newborn. But a
father's desire to reproduce and his financial and emotional attention to
the welfare of the fetus help create a meaningful paternal involvement.
Surrogacy arrangements, then, deserve constitutional protection
because of the private relationships and procreative intention of the
parties, the woman's control over her own body, and the rights of genetic
parents to association with their child.
The gestational mother has a particularly strong right of privacy and
autonomy, founded upon several factors: her experience of artificial
insemination, the changes in her body, her emotional commitment, her
nurturing of the fetus for nine months, and the labor and pain of giving
birth. The fact that she did not originally intend to keep the child does not
dispose of this complex constitutional and social issue. Her bonding and
identification with a baby born of her own body is an understandable and
real human experience.
Supporters of surrogacy contracts ask the gestational mother to
alienate herself from the child she is carrying, to become a dispassionate
incubator for the growing fetus. The gestational mother's claims to control
her own body and to be involved in the parenting of her child cannot be
so easily trivialized. Her physical and psychological burdens deserve
respect beyond the artificial confines of a sterile contract.
The genetic father and his partner use the surrogacy arrangement for
the purpose of having a child, implementing their personal decision to
procreate and to obtain the right to intimate association with the future
offspring. The genetic father has a deep desire to reproduce and to care
(usually tenderly) for a child. It is the father's intention to procreate that
begins the process of reproduction; without his desire to reproduce, there
would be no conception and birth. He has demonstrated by his personal
decision to enter into the arrangement that he has paternal feelings and
desires similar to those of a father in a conventional relationship. His
psychological commitment and human desire to raise and care for a child
entitles him to be treated as a parent and to assert a privacy right
consistent with that status.
It is true that the donation of sperm does not involve the intensely
private sexual and social relationship of conventional reproduction. Nor
does a man have an unqualified right to use his power in the marketplace
to inseminate a stranger for a fee. The principle enunciated in Griswold,
that privacy protects an intimate sexual and social relationship but not a
commercial project, is apt to demonstrate that the genetic father's privacy
rights are not without limit.
Critics would either ban or criminalize surrogacy because of the greater
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stake the gestational mother brings to the arrangement.23 This weighing of
human interests in favor of the gestational mother may have meaning
where there is a discernible conflict of interests. But the logic of those
who would ban surrogacy falters considerably when the interests of both
contracting parties coincide-as they usually do. In such cases the
gestational mother's constitutional interests militate against state
restrictions on surrogacy, not in favor of them.
Balanced against the powerful individual and collective interests in
surrogacy arrangements are the undocumented and speculative interests
of the state. Some persuasively argue that the state has a compelling
interest in protecting the child.2" But surrogacy arrangements do not pose
any clear harm to children. There is the academic argument that no
matter how maltreated or unwanted a child may be, she is better off than
never having been born.25 This is not a powerful argument because the
state may well have a legitimate interest in preventing the birth of babies
whom no one will want or care for. There are, however, no data to
demonstrate that children born as the result of surrogacy contracts are
worse off by any measure-that they suffer more neglect, abandonment,
and physical abuse, or that they receive less nurturing and love.
The Baby M court acknowledged that the long-term effects of
surrogacy contracts are not known, only "feared. 26 The court noted that
the child might suffer from the knowledge that she was born as a result of
a commercial transaction, and that the natural father and gestational
mother might suffer when they "realize the consequences of their
conduct., 27 The fact is that children are often born in adverse
circumstances. Children can thrive when there is only one parent to love
them. The infant born of a surrogacy arrangement is not necessarily
disadvantaged, for she has a genetic father, an adoptive mother, and a
gestational mother who may each come to treasure her. The Baby M
court, moreover, is wrong to suppose that the parents will invariably, or
even frequently, regret their decision. In the majority of cases the parties
see the arrangement as in their own best interests. The hurt and human
sadness evident in the Baby M case should not be used as a benchmark to
judge all surrogacy arrangements.
Others point to the irreconcilable problems posed when the surrogate's
baby turns out to have a physical deformity or a genetically inherited
disease, or to be mentally retarded." Men who sign surrogacy agreements,
it is suggested, want perfect babies in their own images, and would be
more likely to reject an imperfect child. It is true that surrogacy
arrangements appear to stack the deck against an imperfect child, since
neither party has any clear stake in the child. The gestational mother is
invited not to think of the baby as her own. The contracting father has a
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certain image of how the child should be. He will be less likely to bond
with the infant if he has not seen it growing in a woman he loves, seen it
being born, or had a relationship with it in the early days and weeks of its
life. While the possibility of both parents disclaiming responsibility for an
imperfect child is an understandable concern, no data, again, are available
to support it. Many handicapped infants are abandoned, and it is not at all
certain that surrogacy arrangements would have any significant impact on
the rate of abandonment.
Those who would ban or criminalize surrogacy have a heavy burden to
explain why they would allow the state to stifle an activity that fulfills a
human need without imposing any tangible harm on others.
Families in our society take many different forms, and a great deal of
latitude in "private ordering" should be encouraged. Tolerance of
diversity among families, and in the way they are formed, is part of a rich
civil liberties tradition. Society should not be too quick to judge those
who, for whatever reason, use surrogacy as a method of reproduction.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the Baby M case found "no offense
to our current laws where a woman voluntarily and without payment
agrees to act as a 'surrogate' mother, provided that she is not subject to a
binding agreement to surrender her child., 29 However, it found that the
constitutional right to procreate does not extend as far as claimed by the
parties to a surrogacy arrangement. "The right to procreate very simply is
the right to have natural children, whether through sexual intercourse or
artificial insemination. It is no more than that."30 The court suggested that
Mr. Stern and Ms. Whitehead had not been deprived of the right to
procreate as defined, because Baby M is their child.31 It may be true that
these two people were not denied their constitutional right to procreate.
However, the decision of the court to ban, or even criminalize,
commercial surrogacy will obstruct, or certainly chill, the procreative
rights of persons using this method of reproduction in the future. Had the
New Jersey Supreme Court come to this decision previously, it is clear,
Baby M would not have been born.
The New Jersey court held that the payment of money as part of a
surrogacy agreement is contrary to state law and policy. Commercial
surrogacy is "illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to
women."32 In the following section I examine the question of whether the
payment of money should change a legal, possibly constitutionally
protected, activity into an unlawful, possibly criminal, enterprise.
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The State Should Not Permit the Payment of Money in Return for a
Binding Waiver of Parental Rights
If parties have a privacy right to enter into surrogacy arrangements,
should there be any bar to the exchange of money? I will argue that
payments that are made expressly on condition that the gestational
mother agree to a binding termination of her parental rights are
tantamount to the purchase of a baby and should be prohibited. However,
the state should not ban payments to the woman for the conception,
gestation, and birth of the child.
Legal and ethical objections to surrogacy often turn on the payment of
money to the gestational mother and to a third-party broker. The British,
as their media vividly expressed, were revolted by the idea of paying a
price for a human being. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, which
was hastily enacted before the Warnock Committee33 presented its report
to the government, prevents third parties (i.e., brokers) from deriving
financial benefits 4 The act does not expressly ban payments to the
gestational mother.
The most articulate voice in the United States for banning commercial
surrogacy has been the New Jersey Supreme Court. In the Baby M
decision it stated:
This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a
mother's right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that
one of the purchasers is the father. Almost every evil that
prompted the prohibition of payment of money in connection
with adoptions exists here.35
Treating a child as a commodity is unconstitutional and contrary to public
policy. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits
involuntary servitude, or the buying and selling of human beings. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, held that certain payments by
adoptive parents that appeared to be for the child were unconstitutional.
The state constitution declared that all people are born with inalienable
rights, including the right not to be bought or sold.36
State statutes make it a criminal offense to pay to adopt a child.
Surrogacy contracts are markedly similar to paid adoption. In both cases
the payment is for delivery of a baby: there is no substantive difference
between paying a woman to gestate a child and then to deliver it, and
paying a woman to deliver an already "produced" child. Both use a
brokerage mechanism-an adoption agency or a surrogacy broker.3 It
was on the basis of the state adoption statute that the Supreme Court of
New Jersey found the Baby M contract to be unlawful. The court saw the
same conflict with public policy as exists in private adoptions for money.
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There is the "inducement of money," the "coercion of contract," and the
"total disregard of the best interests of the child."38
A Gestational Mother Has the Right to Be Paid for Her Services
If paying for the termination of parental rights is wrong, is it also wrong to
compensate the gestational mother for her services in being artificially
inseminated and carrying the fetus to term? I argue, firstly, that banning
payment for gestational services would deprive the woman of the right to
be paid for valued labor. Secondly, it is important to get beyond the term
"baby-selling." Rather, we should ask what harms would accrue from
paying a woman for gestational services, and how those harms can be
minimized. Finally, a flat prohibition on the payment of money would
chill the practice of surrogacy so thoroughly as to be a de facto ban. This
would deprive the parties of their reproductive rights as surely as a
prohibition on payment for other reproductive services such as
contraception or abortion.
A human being has a right to contract with another to be paid for the
performance of services, even highly personal services. The "women's
work" of conception, gestation, and birth is arduous, and has a high social
worth. For the state to prohibit payment for such work would deprive
women of compensation for valued labor. They are entitled to economic
gain for the physical changes in their bodies, the changes in lifestyle, the
work of carrying a fetus, and the pain and medical risk of labor and
parturition. Critics of surrogacy assert that it enslaves the woman. But
performing personal services and labor in exchange for money is not
equivalent to slavery. There is no slave-master relationship, no
involuntary peonage, and no entitlement to control any human being.
Some advocates claim that paying women to provide reproductive
services exploits poor or uneducated women, who are "coerced" by the
marketplace into selling their intimate personal services.39 As the Baby M
court put it: the "essential evil is... taking advantage of a woman's
circumstances. 40 This is analogous to prostitution, which is a criminal
offense.
A woman's decision to sell her intimate services may well constitute an
indignity for all women and may well mean that she is allowing herself to
be exploited. Nonetheless, that choice is not for the state or the body
politic but for the woman alone to make. As the American Civil Liberties
Union policy on prostitution states, "whether a person chooses to engage
in sexual activity for purposes of recreation, or in exchange for something
of value, is a matter of individual choice, not for governmental
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interference. 4 ' A woman has a privacy right to determine how she will
use her own body, and whether or not she will seek compensation. The
state may not approve of the decision she makes, but it has no right to
override it. It is particularly paternalistic to assume that the state can
dictate a woman's choice because it knows better than she what is in her
interests as a human being.
The Baby M court states that the "evils inherent in baby bartering are
loathsome for a myriad of reasons., 42 However, examination of those
reasons shows they are neither loathsome nor uncorrectable-and that they
are not caused by money changing hands. It is important to get beyond
the charged term "baby-selling" to examine what harm would accrue to
the child, the parties, or society.
I have already referred to the lack of any demonstrable evidence that
the baby in a surrogacy arrangement is harmed by any objective measure.
There is no indication that the potential harm is any greater than the risk
we already tolerate in other births. We do not, for example, restrict the
reproductive freedoms of unwed mothers or "conventional" families with
a history of child neglect, drug or alcohol abuse, or congenital disease
such as AIDS.
Most commentators concede that there is not enough evidence of
potential harm to the children to justify banning commercial surrogacy.
Rather, they argue that the commercialization of reproduction degrades
humankind.43 All personal attributes (e.g., sex, race, height, eye color,
intelligence) would be given a dollar value. This is also a speculative
argument, since it does not rely on any tangible injury to the parties or to
society. The "commodification" argument assumes that it is morally
wrong to pay money for reproductive services. It is not for government to
judge the morality of payment by a genetic father and his partner,
particularly when it is the only way a couple can reproduce. Further,
parents in a surrogacy arrangement want children for reasons probably no
less humane or understandable than those of parents who reproduce by
conventional means. Conventional parents, like surrogate parents, have
children for many reasons, some for love, some for money, and some
because they have a certain image of the offspring they would like to
have. There is no "ideal" reason for choosing a mate and having a baby.
Finally, there is no evidence for the "slippery slope" argument that
commercial surrogacy will lead to market values being placed on
particular genetic traits. As conceived here, surrogacy would be carefully
regulated and non-enforceable by the courts-hardly a strong
encouragement to a free marketplace for babies.
The remaining reasons given by the Baby M court for banning
commercial surrogacy are eminently correctable. The court was
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concerned that there is "no counseling, independent or otherwise, of the
natural mother, no evaluation, no warning"" and that the genetic father
knows "little about the natural mother, her genetic makeup, and her
psychological and medical history. 4' The same can be said of any private
adoption. The legislature has ample regulatory power to require
counseling, as well as social, medical, and psychological reports. The law,
then, can require all that is necessary to ensure full information and the
fitness of the parties to enter into the surrogacy arrangement.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's other criticisms of surrogacy can also
be rectified by adherence to the civil liberties principles set out in this
essay. The court was concerned that the gestational mother is irrevocably
committed "before she knows the strength of her bond with her child."
6
The court's ruling that the gestational mother's contractual waiver is void
means that she is free to change her mind and to contest custody under a
"best interests" standard. The parties to a surrogacy agreement as
envisaged here are in much the same position as unwed parents who have
a custody dispute. The evils of surrogacy do not arise because of the
exchange of money, but because of the contract's irrevocable waiver.
Voiding that contractual provision would eradicate much of the social
concern over surrogacy.
The final argument against banning the payment of money is that it
would thoroughly chill the practice of surrogacy. A ban on payment will
virtually ensure that the would-be parents' individual and collective
reproductive rights are never expressed. Payment for services in our
society has become so essential that prohibiting compensation would
virtually ban the practice. "All parties concede that it is unlikely that
surrogacy will survive without money., 47 One need only contemplate the
prospect of banning payment for other reproductive services, such as
contraception or abortion, to understand the barrier it would pose to
continuation of surrogacy arrangements.
The Difference Between Paying for Gestational Services and for the
Termination of Parental Rights
I have drawn a civil liberties distinction between payment for a binding
agreement to terminate parental rights and for gestational services. The
distinction is supported by the analysis in the following section, stating
why a woman should not be bound by an agreement to terminate her
parental rights. If the distinction is accepted, it provides guidance on how
surrogacy arrangements can be structured so as not to involve the
purchase of a child.
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Surrogacy contracts are equivalent to "baby-selling" if they essentially
offer payment for the delivery of an uncluttered title to the child. The
state could block this approach by proscribing payment of any fee
contingent upon termination of the woman's parental rights, while
allowing periodic payments throughout the pregnancy to compensate the
woman for her services and health care expenses.
It will be argued that structuring a contract as payment for services
rather than for delivery of the child is a "nice" legal distinction, but that
this nonetheless remains merely a pretense for baby-selling. After all,
when a person pays for labor, he or she is really paying for the commodity
that the labor produces. The genetic father is not interested in the
gestational mother's childbearing experiences. He wants, and believes he
is paying for, her baby. The New Jersey Supreme Court had
no doubt whatsoever that the money is being paid to obtain an
adoption and not.., for the personal services of Mary Beth
Whitehead.... It strains credulity to claim that these
arrangements, touted by those in the surrogacy business as an
attractive alternative to the usual route leading to an adoption,
really amount to something other than a private placement
adoption for money.'
That is true when a gestational mother can be compelled by contract to
give up her baby. It is not true, however, where she is entitled to maintain
her parental rights. The issue is not what a contracting father wants or
what a private broker promises, but what the law will allow. If the law
does not allow payment in exchange for the child, and if the courts will
not enforce any contractual provision in which the woman waives her
parental rights, then the distinction between payment for the baby and
payment for gestational services is real, and not a pretense. The surrogacy
contract would provide no entitlement to the child.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Surrogate Parenting v. Corn. Ex
Rel. Armstrong,"9 considered whether a valid constitutional distinction
could be drawn between payment for gestational services and payment for
the child. The court held that payments to the woman under a surrogacy
contract were for her services, not the baby. The woman could not be
forced by the contract to forgo her parental rights; therefore, there was no
selling of the baby. This decision is consistent with the civil liberties
arguments presented here, except for the manner in which payment was
actually made:
[A] portion of the fee is paid in advance for the use of her body
as an incubator, but a portion of the payment is withheld and is
not paid until her child is delivered unto the purchaser, along
with the equivalent of a bill of sale, or quit claim deed, to wit-the
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judgment terminating her parental rights. How can it be denied
that this last payment is in fact payment for the baby?0
A civil liberties theory of surrogacy would avoid this inconsistency by
prohibiting payments under a contract in exchange for the waiver of the
parental rights of the gestational mother.
A Gestational Mother Cannot Waive Her Rights to Determine Her Own
Lifestyle, to Have an Abortion, or to Parent Her Child
One simple way to determine parental rights over the child born of a
surrogacy agreement is to grant them to the father. After all, the
gestational mother signed a contract in which she probably made a series
of promises about her lifestyle, medical treatment, and, most importantly,
parental rights over the child." Many surrogacy contracts provide for
specific performance of these promises. 2 Why shouldn't the gestational
mother be compelled in a court of law to fulfill her contractual
obligations?53
The legal question of whether a person can waive" privacy and parental
rights are unsettled. There is a strong presumption against waiver of
constitutional or fundamental rights." A person cannot waive
constitutional rights unless she does so knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently, "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. 5 6 This "voluntariness and knowledge" standard
might be applied in individual cases to show that the gestational mother
did or did not make a fully informed choice when she signed the contract.
There are some rights, however, that cannot be irrevocably waived-that
is, the person can change her mind even after she has agreed to waive her
rights.7 For example, criminal defendants cannot irrevocably waive the
right to be present at trial in a capital case,58 to raise a plea of
incompetence to stand trial,59 or to assert a privilege against
self-incrimination.
Advance waiver of a constitutional right is particularly troublesome,
because the person cannot foresee all the circumstances that will affect a
future decision. Therefore, some rights can be waived only at the time
they could be invoked. A federal Court of Appeal refused for this reason
to recognize a woman's waiver of her due-process rights when signing a
foster-care contract, because the relationship the foster parent sought to
protect did not exist at the time she signed the contract.6'
The courts, therefore, have been highly suspicious of advance waivers
of fundamental rights. However, there has been no specific judicial
guidance on whether the courts would refuse, on constitutional grounds,
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to enforce the various promises that are often made in surrogacy
contracts.62 I will argue that to hold a woman to a promise to waive her
human rights sometime in the future diminishes her constitutional
entitlements. I am not suggesting, however, that a gestational mother
cannot waive the exercise of her rights at the time they have to be
invoked. She can choose not to avail herself of her right to an abortion or
to conduct her life the way she pleases. A gestational mother can also
decide not to assert her parental rights when the child is born or,
preferably, after a period of time following the birth. This is analogous to
state adoption statutes that allow a woman who has agreed to relinquish
her parental rights over her baby to change her mind any time before the
baby is born. In most states the mother has a grace period after birth in
which she can still decide to keep the child.
The rights of a gestational mother to make future decisions about her
body, lifestyle, and an intimate future relationship with her child are so
important to her dignity and human happiness that they should be
regarded as inalienable. First, consider the contractual provisions that
seek to deprive the gestational mother of her right to make decisions
about her medical treatment and lifestyle: restricting or prohibiting
smoking, use of alcohol or drugs (prescription as well as recreational), sex
or other "strenuous" activity, and abortion; or requiring regular prenatal
examination, amniocentesis, and abortion if the baby is likely to be
severely handicapped.
The rights to choose one's lifestyle and medical treatment are among
the most private aspects of human life. The government itself cannot
restrict these activities unless it demonstrates that the person is
incompetent or that there is some compelling health purpose. 3 No such
health purpose exists in surrogacy, particularly where these activities take
place in private and do not affect the public. Since the government cannot
reach into this intensely private domain, it is difficult to envisage a private
party having the power to do so based upon a contractual obligation.
The genetic father will point to the potential harm to the fetus as the
rationale for intervention. This makes the mother and fetus into
adversaries, locked in a conflict over whose health and well-being will
prevail.' While courts recently have been prepared to intervene in cases
of immediate and substantial threat to the fetus (e.g., to require a
Cesarean delivery),65 the government does not have a general right to
control how a pregnant woman lives her life or the medical treatment she
chooses. It would be unconscionable if pregnant women could have
private decisions forced on them in ways that would be wholly
unimaginable for others. Pregnancy, although it entails another life to
consider, should not become a license for denying women their basic right
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to be left alone to make the health decisions they choose.
Neither government nor a private party has the right to dictate deeply
personal choices to the gestational mother, even if they have extracted a
promise in exchange for money. Just as important is the deep invasion of
privacy involved in monitoring and possibly enforcing the gestational
mother's compliance with her promises. There is no lawful and ethical
way to determine how a gestational mother is behaving within her own
home. Various monitoring and enforcement methods themselves pose
threats to individual privacy and autonomy-e.g., testing blood for alcohol
or drug use. And to compel submission to a medical procedure such as a
gynecological examination, amniocentesis, or abortion is tantamount to a
battery-an unconscionable violation of the woman's bodily integrity.66
There has not been much caselaw in these areas. However, an analysis
of the Supreme Court's abortion decisions indicates that choices affecting
privacy and autonomy are for the woman alone to make. In Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth67 the Supreme Court held that a husband does not
have the right to veto his wife's decision to seek an abortion. "Since the
State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion ... the State cannot delegate
authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent
abortion."6 In Belotti v. Baird69 the Supreme Court also invalidated a state
statute that required a woman to get her parents' consent to an abortion.
70
As neither husbands nor parents can overrule a woman's decision to get
an abortion, the courts would be highly unlikely to give this right to the
father in a surrogacy arrangement.71
The second major right that surrogacy contracts seek to deny the
gestational mother is her choice to assert parental claims over her child.
Natural parents have parental rights over their children unless there is a
judicial finding that their behavior is seriously detrimental to the child's
interests. Decisions about parenthood, like treatment and lifestyle
decisions, are essential to dignity and future happiness. These rights may
seem abstract and unimportant before they need to be invoked. The
gestational mother signs the contract because, at the time, she may have
no interest in having a baby herself and she sees the arrangement as
offering financial compensation for work performed.72 Yet once the
gestational mother is faced with the actual decision, her rights become of
utmost importance. Understandably, the gestational mother's feelings
may change once she has nurtured the fetus, given birth to a human being
whom she recognizes as part of herself and then holds, cares for, and
comes to love. Any parent who has experienced birth and the discovery of
the infant's unique human qualities and character cannot help but
appreciate the possibility of such changes in feelings, judgment, and
outlook.
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Irreversible decisions about child-rearing, then, ought not to be forced
on any mother nine months before her rights have any real meaning. The
decision to give up one's own child for a lifetime is an awesome
responsibility to place on any human being.
Proponents of surrogacy repeatedly assert that to hold these personal
rights inalienable is indefensibly paternalistic, and disparaging of the
decision-making capacity of women." To hold the parental right
inalienable, they suggest, is to degrade women by implying they need to
be protected from their "irrational" or "whimsical" impulses, and that
they cannot understand the import of relinquishing a child.
These arguments show an almost willful blindness to the true meaning
of paternalism and to the reasons why fundamental rights should be
inalienable. It is paternalistic to make a decision for another person
because you believe you know better than she what is in her true interests.
To hold the parental right inalienable is not paternalistic at all. Rather, it
respects the woman's final decision regarding her bodily integrity and
future associations. The principle of inalienability indicates that the
woman controls her own destiny and cannot be prevented by contract
from making the decision herself when it becomes important.
This argument is not gender-based. There are certain things that we can
contract about-property, goods, and services. But there are other things so
important to human flourishing and self-respect that they should not be
specifically enforceable by contract, whether the subject is male or female.
We do not call patients "fickle," for example, if they decide to withdraw
their previously given consent to a medical procedure. It is insulting to
suggest that because the law allows gestational mothers to withdraw
consent to a waiver of parental rights, the women are indecisive or need
protection.
Determining Custody Within a Civil Liberties Framework
When a child is born of a surrogacy arrangement, the woman who gave
birth to the child is the legal mother unless she relinquishes her parental
status through adoption. The man who entered into the agreement and
who donated his sperm is the legal father. Termination of the parental
rights of the gestational mother or the genetic father can be judicially
determined only under statutory criteria in each state. Most states will not
terminate parental rights unless it is demonstrated that the parent is unfit;
a mere showing that it would not be in the child's best interests to live
with a parent is insufficient to terminate the parent's wider parental
rights, including visitation.74
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The two genetic parents in a surrogacy arrangement may each want
custody of the child. If one of them declines to waive a claim to the child
and a dispute ensues, who should have custody? And by what standard
should the question be determined?
Custody determinations are potentially so harmful to the child that
many believe the law should intervene with a clear rule favoring the
genetic father or the gestational mother.5 Undoubtedly, custody battles
should be avoided wherever possible because of the potential trauma to
the child. But a judicial determination becomes necessary when each
parent seeks custody over the child, and it is not obvious in every case
which placement would be in the child's best interests. The adoption of an
automatic rule foreclosing the parental rights of the man or the woman
would be iniquitous. First, "bright line" rules deter deeper inquiry into the
best interests of the child in each case. Using sex as a proxy for a
thoroughgoing assessment of the child's interests would not serve those
interests well. Second, the parental interests of either the father or the
mother would not be respected. Natural parents have substantive and
procedural due process rights to assert a claim to custody before a court."
A "clear rule" would determine which parent could exercise the
fundamental right of association with one's children by presumption,
rather than by individual findings of fact. Third, a "clear rule" amounts to
a rigid form of discrimination based upon gender. Whether a court uses
the contract to favor the father or sees the woman's unique reproductive
capabilities as a reason to favor the mother,77 it is really using the parents'
sex, rather than a best-interests standard, to determine custody. This
would permit custody to be based on status criteria traditionally used to
discriminate against individuals.
These reasons against a clear rule are all based upon strong civil
liberties principles, which should not be abridged except for compelling
reasons. Both sides in the surrogacy debate argue that there are
compelling reasons for a clear rule in their favor. I have already shown
why there should not be a paternal presumption based upon the surrogacy
contract. Nor should economic status be the sole determining factor for
assessing a child's best interests. Economic status usually favors the
father-particularly in a surrogacy arrangement, which virtually guarantees
a marked disparity in the wealth of the mother and the father. Material
advantage is not an important measure for the best interests of the child,
and has a discriminatory effect on women. The "best interests" test is
designed to help the child become a "well integrated person who might
reasonably be expected to be happy with life., 78 The court should not be
concerned with the kind of "idealized life that money can buy.
7 9
Advocates of the rights of the gestational mother say she has
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contributed most to the surrogacy arrangement. Her nine months of
gestation not only make her deserving of the child but also put her in a
much better position to form a bond and to care for the child. 0 It is
argued, moreover, that the present law on parentage already provides a
clear preference for the gestational mother. A woman who gives birth to a
child is held legally responsible for its welfare, whereas sperm donors
cannot assert a parental claim over any child born by use of their sperm.
The comparison between a genetic father who simply donates sperm
and one who enters into a surrogacy agreement is inapt, however. Once a
donor gives his sperm to a bank in return for a fee he has completed his
"transaction"; he has no intention to reproduce. and has not committed
himself to, or prepared for, the responsibilities of parenthood. Moreover,
once the man has donated his sperm he knows nothing further of its use.
In short, he has not acted like a father and has no ground for asserting the
rights of a father. By contrast, a genetic father in a surrogacy arrangement
initiates the whole procreative process. His psychological, emotional, and
financial investment in planning the birth, care, and nurturance of the
child may be considerable. He acts like a father in the sense that he has an
intent to procreate and desires a relationship with the child.
The Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois8 held that an unwed father is
entitled to notice and a hearing before a court determines that he has no
right to custody of his child. Subsequent cases, involving foreclosure of
parental rights through adoption rather than denial of custody,82 do limit
the principle enunciated in Stanley. Those cases suggest that a father
acquires due process rights only when he "act[s] as a father toward his
children."83 Thus, an unwed father who visited and supported his child
only irregularly had no constitutional right to a hearing.4 Conversely,
where the father established a relationship by living with, caring for, and
supporting the child, he did have due process rights .85
Most troubling about the Stanley line of cases is that the Court appears
to be concerned with the custodial, personal, and financial relationship
the father actually established. The father's intent and good-faith efforts
to establish a relationship with his child are insufficient. In Lehr v.
Robertson,6 the putative father had taken every opportunity to establish a
relationship with his child. He lived with the mother for two years until
the birth and visited the child in the hospital every day; he never ceased in
his efforts to locate the child after the mother concealed her; and he
offered financial support. The Court, nonetheless, held that he had no
right to a hearing before termination of his parental rights.
In a surrogacy arrangement the genetic father ought not to be
foreclosed from a hearing on the best interests of the child. He had the
paternal intention to procreate, and he may have done all that he could to
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prepare for the child and to seek a relationship with her. We should not
automatically assume that it is always in the best interests of the child to
remain with the mother.
Civil liberties principles, therefore, require that such factors as sex and
economic status should not become proxies for assessing an individual
child's best interests. Neither factor is a good predictor of the ability to
parent well-although both should be considered, to the extent strictly
relevant to the child's best interests.
Custody should also be determined without regard to the existence of
the surrogacy agreement. The fact that the mother entered into a
surrogacy agreement should not be held against her in determining
custody; she has not neglected, abandoned, or adversely affected her child
in any way. A woman is no less able to parent her child because she
originally decided to surrender her legitimate claim as its true mother.
This conclusion is consistent with the civil liberties approach taken here
that contractual provisions requiring an irrevocable waiver of parental
rights should be void. To use a surrogacy agreement against the
gestational mother in a custody dispute would inhibit the exercise of her
constitutional right to associate with her child.
Conclusion
The approach to custody taken in this essay is simple and consistent with
current law and practice. If the surrogacy arrangement goes as planned, as
so many have in the past, then the child will grow up with parents
probably as stable and secure as the parents of any conventionally born
child. I also treat surrogacy arrangements that break down in the same
way as the law treats marriages that break down or births out of wedlock.
None of these cases of parents tugging at their child for custody are happy
ones. Yet none create insurmountable obstacles to the future well-being
of the child. So long as the law treats the child as a person wanted by both
parents and sensitively allocates parental rights and responsibilities,
including custody, there is every reason to believe that the child can, and
will, flourish.
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